We would like to draw your attention to three articles published in three Spanish newspapers signed by the President of the UEF and former MEP,, Domenec Ruiz Devesa, by the President of UEF Spain and former President of the European Parliament, Enrique Baron Crespo, with the following co-authors Mario Regidor Arenales, Presidente de UEF Canarias y Ex-Concejal del Ayuntamiento de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (La Informacion), Carles Arqués, Presidente de UEF Comunitat Valenciana (Canarias 7), and Leopoldo Tolivar, Presidente del consejo Asturiano del Movimiento Europeo (El Comercio).
Original article in Canarias 7 here
Signed by Domènec Ruiz Devesa, Enrique Barón Crespo, Mario Regidor Arenales
Ayer toda Europa conmemoraba el 80 aniversario del final de la II Guerra Mundial, y hoy celebramos el Día de Europa y los 75 años de la Declaración del 9 de mayo. Estos dos acontecimientos, la derrota del nazismo, y la visión de Schuman y de Monnet, abrieron, respectivamente, la vía al orden multilateral basado en reglas, y a la construcción de la unidad europea, pero también al mundo bipolar y al fin de la hegemonía de los imperios europeos sobre el resto del mundo.
Hoy, el orden de 1945, reforzado en 1989, está seriamente cuestionado por Putin y Trump, es decir por las dos potencias que lo construyeron, sobre todo los EEUU, pero también por Netanyahu, potencias revisionistas como Irán, Corea del Norte, o China, y por otras razones, por muchos líderes del llamado Sur Global que aspiran a otro reparto del poder global y a una reforma del multilateralismo.
En cierto modo, la unificación federal europea es ahora aun más necesaria que en 1945. Entonces la integración supranacional era necesaria para poner fin a las guerras entre europeos, y para crear un mercado común que sustentara nuestra prosperidad económica. No es poca cosa, con todas las imperfecciones que se quieran sacar a relucir.
Pero si queremos preservar nuestro modelo social y nuestra seguridad, una Europa más unida y más fuerte es imprescindible para garantizar nuestra supervivencia como sujeto de la Historia en la nueva geopolítica mundial. La Historia o se hace o se sufre. Somos una parte mucho más pequeña de la población y la economía del planeta que hace ochenta años. En 1950 la actual UE representaba el 14% de la población mundial. Hoy representa el 5%. En 1970 el PIB de la UE-27 representaba el 25% de la economía mundial. Hoy constituye el 7,7%.
Ya no contamos con el apoyo de nuestro aliado tradicional, Putin amenaza nuestra seguridad desde el Este, y corremos el riesgo de perder la carrera tecnológica respecto a China y Estados Unidos. Europa debe ser un actor geopolítico, más cohesionado internamente desde el punto de vista institucional, y capaz de organizar su seguridad y defensa y de proyectar poder hacia el resto del mundo, en defensa de sus valores e intereses. Pero este nuevo orden también puede ser una oportunidad para Europa, que ya no sería solo libre y unida, sino también independiente, constituyendo un cuarto polo no imperialista, dedicado con otros países y regiones del mundo a preservar el comercio internacional y el orden multilateral.
Esto supone un cambio cultural en la construcción europea. La UE nació como un proyecto de paz cosmopolita, es decir lo contrario de la política del equilibrio de poderes, las esferas de influencia, o de la política de potencia. La construcción europea desde los años cincuenta se mira al espejo y ve a Kant, no a Maquiavelo. No por casualidad hemos construido juntos un gran mercado y una moneda, no un ejército común. Este modelo floreció en la inmediata posguerra fría, con el momento unipolar, la protección estadounidense, la reunificación de Europa, la expansión de la globalización, el multilateralismo, y la democracia.
Pero desde la invasión a gran escala de Ucrania y la vuelta de Trump ya no vivimos en ese mundo, que no volverá, incluso cuando aquel acabe su mandato en 2029. En consecuencia, Europa debe organizar su propio sistema de defensa, que ya no puede depender exclusivamente de la OTAN, pero sí puede ser su pilar europeo. Pero esto requiere poner a disposición ingentes recursos, evitar el riesgo de una colección de rearmes nacionales sin coordinación, y crear una cadena de mando europea, como ha propuesto Draghi.
Carecemos de capacidades suficientes en inteligencia, comunicaciones, misiles de largo y medio alcance, sistemas de defensa antiaéreos y un largo etcétera. Tampoco disponemos de los 300.000 soldados que se necesitan para la defensa territorial de Europa si los estadounidenses se retiran del continente. Colmar estas lagunas requiere no menos de 230.000 millones de euros adicionales al año y no bastará con emitir de nuevo deuda europea si no acordamos a la vez como vamos a amortizarla, porque además hay que invertir más en innovación, reindustrialización, y transición ecológica y digital. No puede haber deuda sin impuestos, ni política de defensa europea a costa del Estado del Bienestar.
En efecto, Europa hasta ahora se ha caracterizado por su potencia comercial, normativa, y hasta monetaria. En estos tres cuartos de siglo hemos unido muchas dimensiones de nuestra vida económica, social, y política. Pero hay dos elementos esenciales del poder de los que carece Europa: ejército y tributos. Así nacieron los estados modernos, que disponían de la capacidad de recaudar impuestos para financiar las campañas militares. Pero también las federaciones, que siempre se dotaron de una fuerza para defenderse del enemigo exterior, y de unos impuestos para financiarla, como hizo Hamilton en los Estados Unidos. Por tanto, el establecimiento de un Sistema de Defensa Europeo va a requerir una unión política más estrecha, porque ya sabemos que hay monedas sin estado, incluso estados sin ejército, pero no ejércitos sin estado o al menos sin una federación. Todo ello sin olvidar que la política de defensa no consiste únicamente en proveerse de un ejército y armas, sino en estar preparados a nivel de ciberseguridad y prevención de emergencias para hacer frente a nuevas formas de guerras híbridas.
Por supuesto, no podemos ni debemos olvidar lo que ha supuesto para Canarias la integración de España en el sistema económico y político de la Unión Europea. Los Fondos de Cohesión, el Fondo Social Europeo, los fondos FEDER de Desarrollo Regional han contribuido a que regiones y ciudades hayan incrementado su PIB acercándonos a una redistribución de la riqueza que han contribuido a disminuir las desigualdades sociales y económicas que imperaban en Canarias desde la época de la dictadura franquista.
La condición de Región Ultraperiférica (RUP) referido en el artículo 349 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea al igual que el respeto a nuestro Régimen Económico y Fiscal (REF) consagrado en nuestro Estatuto de Autonomía han constituido un acicate de inestimable ayuda para un mejor desarrollo económico y social del archipiélago contribuyendo a reducir nuestra tasa de desempleo estructural y fortaleciendo el nivel formativo de la ciudadanía canaria, todo ello en un sistema político que debe seguir ahondando a nivel nacional y europeo en una federalización ahora más necesaria que nunca donde la cesión de soberanía hacia una entidad supranacional como es la Unión Europea redunda en el beneficio para las diferentes regiones de los 27 países miembros.
Article in La Informacion, here online version
signed by Domènec Ruiz Devesa, Enrique Barón Crespo, Carles Arqués
Presidente de la Unión de los Federalistas Europeos (UEF) y exeurodiputado; Presidente de UEF España y Expresidente del Parlamento Europeo; Presidente de UEF Comunitat Valenciana
Article in El Comercio, here online version
signed by Domènec Ruiz Devesa, Enrique Barón Crespo y Leopoldo Tolivar
Presidente de la Unión de los Federalistas Europeos (UEF) y eurodiputado / Presidente de UEF España y expresidente del Parlamento Europeo / Presidente del Consejo Asturiano del Movimiento Europeo
Here the the video recording of the meeting
The Union of European Federalists welcomes the publication of the Draft Report on the Institutional Aspects of the Report on the Future of European Competitiveness, authored by MEP Brando Benifei (former Chair of the Spinelli Group) in his role as rapporteur for the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs.
This report builds on Mario Draghi’s comprehensive analysis of Europe’s competitiveness and delivers a strong political message: the EU’s ability to compete globally and safeguard its social, environmental, and democratic values depends on bold institutional reform.
The draft supports core federalist proposals, including:
- A shift towards stronger supranational governance,
"Supports the analysis that [...] all this can be achieved only if the EU urgently reorganises its institutional and economic governance, abandons fragmented national approaches and strengthens refocused, accelerated and simplified supranational decision-making at EU level, in order to act more efficiently and effectively where it matters most, as a true global actor."
(Point 2, General considerations)
2. Extension of qualified majority voting in key policy areas,
"Reiterates its call to go beyond unanimity and move as soon as possible to QMV and the ordinary legislative procedure in all policy fields, in order to have more streamlined and decisive decision-making, including on social, fiscal and economic policies, digitalisation, the green transition and defence."
(Point 8, Refocusing, accelerating and simplifying the work of the EU)
3. The establishment of a permanent EU fiscal capacity,
"Stresses the urgent need to establish a full and permanent fiscal capacity for the EU, building on the features of NextGenerationEU; highlights, in this regard, the importance of creating common European instruments, such as eurobonds, to finance strategic joint investments in European public goods and services."
(Point 22, Building a permanent European fiscal capacity)
4. Completion of the Single Market and the Capital Markets Union,
"Calls for the European single market to be completed and the remaining barriers to access to be overcome [...] and for economic growth, social, economic and territorial cohesion, and cultural exchange to be promoted within the EU."
(Point 16, Completing the European single market)
"Calls for the development of a European integrated capital market through a newly established SIU, building on the incomplete CMU [...], providing better financing opportunities for European companies while fostering the EU’s economic growth and competitiveness."
(Point 18, Completing the European single market)
5. A genuine European Energy Union and Defence Union,
"Calls [...] for a permanent European green sovereign fund, directly financed through EU own resources, a reformed European Investment Bank (EIB) [...] and a green transition authority within the Commission."
(Point 23, Shaping a European energy union)
"Calls [...] to achieve the goal of a European defence union, to overcome the fragmentation of the European defence industry and to improve the consistency between existing and future instruments, including at the level of governance, in order to ensure effective democratic control of the new defence union."
(Point 24, Creating a European defence union)
6. Treaty reform in line with the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe.
"Recalls the conclusions of the CoFE, in particular the need for treaty reform; and urges the Commission and the Council to take concrete and timely steps to follow up on these recommendations."
(Point 10, Refocusing, accelerating and simplifying the work of the EU)
Importantly, this work also reflects the active input of federalist experts. Giulia Rossolillo, Vice-President of the Union of European Federalists, Luca Lionello, Chair of UEF's Political Commission 1 on Federalist Strategy for a Federal Reform of the EU, and Alejandro Peinado, Secretary General of UEF Spain, all contributed to the preparatory work of the report. Their involvement is a concrete sign of the influence and relevance of the federalist movement in shaping the institutional future of the Union.
This draft report represents a major step forward for all who believe in a stronger, democratic, and sovereign Europe. It is now crucial for the European Parliament and Member States to act on its recommendations — and move forward with the political courage needed to complete the European project.
The Union of European Federalists reaffirms its full support for these proposals and calls on all European institutions to translate them into action.
Europe of Landscapes and Gardens. What European Policies for Garden and Landscape Heritage?
Yes, for centuries, landscapes have been one of the markers (historical, cultural, and political) of the European continent, and the garden, a constituent element of these landscapes, allows us to understand them in a privileged way.
Co-organized by the Maison Jean Monnet, the European Institute of Gardens and Landscapes, and the Association Paradeisos - European Gardens, this event will bring together European personalities, practitioners, specialists, and researchers who will discuss the cultural, political, and environmental issues related to the (re)cognition, conservation, and enhancement of European landscape heritage.
The President of the Union of European Federalists, Domènec Ruiz Devesa has particpated on this International Dialogue with a speech titled "The Island of Ventotene: Public Recognition of a Historical Landscape Linked to European Construction" on 25th of April.
Find out more here: LINK.
Brussels, 11 April 2024
The 146-page “Responsibility for Germany” Coalition Agreement (in brief Agreement) was presented on 9 April 2025 by the representatives of the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU), Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU) and Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) after close to a month of negotiations. The compromise package is intended to form the basis for cooperation between the three parties, which would build the German Federal Government for the next four years. As the most populous Member State and the one with the highest GDP among the 27, Germany should embrace its specific position within the EU in a manner that serves the entire Union.
The fifth of six chapters focuses on “Europe” that starts with these words “The EU is a guarantor of freedom, peace, security and prosperity. These values are under intense pressure from historical changes. The times demand courage, determination and European responses. Our country can only have a positive future with a strong and democratic EU. We will exploit every possibility to strengthen the EU's capacity for action and strategic sovereignty.”
According the three coalition parties, German interests are very much intertwined with European interests. “Germany is poised to take on more responsibility in and for Europe, as declared by the future government. This is a positive development and long overdue.” declared Christian Moos, the Secretary General of Europa Union Deutschland (EUD).
The European Federalists welcomes this document because it shares a common vision of strengthening Europe's defence capabilities, as issued by the recent Memorandum on a European Defence Union (in brief Memorandum) published by the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, that was sent to the main European policymakers at 5th March 20251 in view of the upcoming meeting of the European Council on 6th March, the Plenary of the European Parliament of 10th March, and the publication of the White Paper on Defence on 19th March, 2025.
Many elements of the Coalition Agreement are in convergence with the Memorandum showing that the German coalition’s political stances are in line with the aspiration of the European Federalists. Here below the main points of convergences:
1. Advancing a European Defence Union
Both documents promote the strategic autonomy of the European Union and support closer cooperation with NATO while building a robust European defence pillar.
The agreement acknowledges NATO’s continued role as the cornerstone of collective defence for many EU members (“For many Member States, NATO remains the guarantor of collective security.”) but advocates for the creation of the European Pillar of the NATO.
2. Standardisation, interoperability and joint defence industrial cooperation
Both plans stress the importance of harmonising weapons systems and operational standards to improve battlefield effectiveness and reduce inefficiencies. There is strong agreement on the need to overcome industrial fragmentation in Europe and to encourage joint investment, R&D, and procurement of European-made defence technologies.
The Coalition Agreement and the Memorandum support expanding the EU's operational capabilities, encouraging:
- A stronger European defence industry cooperation,
- The development of key technologies
- Joint defence projects among Member States
- A unified European defence market with coordinated export rules
Both documents highlight the strategic importance of space, cybersecurity, AI, and advanced technologies in Europe's future defence architecture.
2. Strategic use of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
PESCO is presented as a key tool in both documents for enabling a core group of member states to deepen integration in security and defence. In the Agreement is written that PESCO projects have to strengthen “European strategic sovereignty".
The agreement strongly emphasizes solidarity with Ukraine and strengthening European defence to protect freedom and peace: this implies a political commitment to collective security.
3. European financing instruments for defence
Both documents advocate for the use of EU-level funding and new financial tools to support defence spending, including exempting such investments from deficit rules under the Stability and Growth Pact.
But Germany reaffirms its commitment to fiscal prudence, opposing the permanent mutualization of debt within the EU. While supporting existing recovery instruments such as NextGenerationEU, the coalition emphasizes that extraordinary financial tools must remain temporary and exceptional.
However, Merz has requested that the German constitutional brake on debt be removed in order to launch a major investment plan for defence and infrastructure (potentially more than one trillion euros) that will allow Germany to grow economically to the benefit of other EU countries and increase its defence capacity.
4. Support for Ukraine as a shared security frontier
Each text recognises Ukraine’s defence as central to European security and the international rules-based order.
5. Deepening European Institutions: Openness to Treaty reform (Article 48 TEU)
While the Memorandum urgently calls for reforming the EU treaties to remove veto powers and increase integration, the coalition agreement states:
“Where necessary, we are open to treaty changes under Article 48 TEU.”
— signalling a cautious yet notable openness to legal and institutional reforms.
The coalition supports the use of “passerelle clauses” which would allow moving beyond unanimity voting in decision-making to the qualified majority in certain political areas and encourages closer cooperation among willing member states.
The followings points of the Memorandum are absent in the Coalition Agreement:
- No reference to a permanent 28th European Army in the German coalition agreement
The Memorandum calls for the establishment of a new European Army as part of a European Defence System (EDS). This idea is absent from the coalition text.
- Lack of nuclear deterrence integration
While the Memorandum advocates Europeanising France’s nuclear capabilities with shared funding, this is not addressed by the German Coalition.
The Union of European Federalists welcomes also two points that are in line with our political request to the EU Member States Governments.
1. Clear Support for EU Enlargement but with Institutional Deepening in parallel
The coalition expresses strong political backing for the accession of Ukraine, Moldova, and countries of the Western Balkans. Germany proposes a step-by-step integration process for candidate countries, including partial participation in EU programs.
Institutional reforms are seen as a necessary parallel step to ensure the EU’s capacity to absorb new member states. The UEF calls on governments, national politics, and European institutions to tackle the EU capacity to enlarge with its last statement “Is the European Union at risk of losing the enlargement battle as well?” approved in Budapest, 16 November 2024.
2. Reforming the European Parliament’s Electoral Law
The Koalitionsvertrag 2025 explicitly endorses the introduction of transnational electoral lists as part of a broader effort to strengthen democratic legitimacy and political discourse at the European level. The new coalition government commits to supporting a uniform European electoral law that includes transnational lists, with the aim of fostering a truly pan-European democratic space.
This position aligns with UEF's advocacy during the last European elections and with the Resolution of December 12, 2023, on the European Elections 2024, for which UEF President Domenec Ruiz Devesa served as Rapporteur during his term as an MEP from 2019 to 2024.
"The Union of European Federalists very much welcomes the clear commitment of the coalition partners for a stronger and more integrated European Union. On a European Defence Union, we noticed in many points similarities with our recent Memorandum on European Defence Union by the Action Committee for the United States of Europe." says Domenec Ruiz Devesa, President of the UEF and former MEP.
“The position of the coalition agreement on the necessary institutional reforms also follows the positions that the UEF and its national sections have been calling for some time: there cannot be enlargement without deepening. To go faster in these very versatile and unstable times of emergency and to create trust among member states, it is necessary to use all the possibilities relying in the Treaties, but sooner or later it will be necessary to open up the reform of the Treaties according to art. 48 as requested by the European Parliament in November 2023”.
The coalition treaty between the CDU, CSU, and SPD includes calls and commitments for a more autonomous and capable European Union, emphasizing 'strategic sovereignty' for Europe, particularly in response to current geopolitical challenges. These positions align closely with those of the UEF.
The goals are ambitious and promising. Germany has the potential to bring new momentum and drive the necessary deepening of the European Union. The coalition treaty has raised hopes and expectations. The challenge now is to translate these words into action.
You can read here the German version.
570+ Organisations Join Forces to Defend Civil Society
European civil society organisations (CSOs) are currently facing an attack coming from certain Members of the European Parliament. Spearheaded by some MEPs from the European People’s Party (EPP) and by far-right groups, this attack resorts to misleading arguments to fabricate a scandal. This portrayal has been amplified through the media, with notable exceptions of articles that attempted to clarify this misleading narrative. European CSOs are crucial to ensure the voices of citizens from different parts of Europe are heard in the EU institutions. Attacks against civil society are unfortunately not new and are exacerbated by this harmful idea. Furthermore, for-profit corporate lobbying is through the roof when compared to non-profit advocacy. In 2024, the 50 corporations with the largest lobbying budgets collectively spent nearly €200 million on lobbying the EU alone (66% more than in 2015). Comparing this to the funding environmental NGOs receive under the LIFE programme - €15.6 million annually of a €700 million yearly budget - truly shows the weakness of this ‘scandal’.
This is why over 570 civil society organisations from 40 countries, including all EU Member States, have joined forces to call on those in power to act now and ensure that civil society is adequately funded and enabled to share our crucial perspectives. In this statement, we address:
- The source of this false narrative;
- Inaccurate claims made about how CSOs obtain and use funding;
- Why it’s paramount that CSOs receive sufficient funding;
- The need for civil dialogue to enable CSOs participation.
Democracy is about the right of citizens to be collectively heard for building an inclusive society and a shared European future; properly funded independent CSOs are a crucial tool for that. We call on decision-makers to ensure civil society organisations can thrive and play their role in interacting with policy-makers in order to have a more fully informed decision-making process.
Read the full statement with the list of all supporters here below, and our previous statement on this matter here.
Civil Society Europe (CSE) is the coordination of civil society organisations at EU level. Through its membership, CSE unites EU-level membership-based organisations that reach out to millions of people active in or supported by not-for-profits and civil society organisations across the EU. CSE was created by several civil society organisations as a follow-up to the European Year of Citizens and was established as an international not-for-profit under Belgian law in 2016. Since then, it has become the point of reference for EU institutions on transversal issues concerning civil dialogue and civic space.
For further information on this topic, please contact matteo.vespa@civilsocietyeurope.eu
25 April 2025
An Update on NGO Funding Attacks & How You Can Still Support
Dear signatories,
We at Civil Society Europe warmly thank you for your participation in our statement against NGO funding attacks that was launched on April 7th. By engaging with us and spreading our message, you directly contributed to raising awareness across Europe on this issue and are helping us turn the tide in favour of civil society. Since the statement’s release, we saw a report on the transparency of EU funding to NGOs by the European Court of Auditors be published, which confirmed that there is no evidence of irregularities or misuse in how NGOs are selected or how EU grants are used.
Furthermore, EU budget Commissioner Piotr Serafin, in response to a parliamentary question, reiterated the importance of independent civil society and spoke against the false narrative that NGOs engaged in ‘undue lobbying activities’ on the Commission's behalf.However, our work is far from over. The report on the discharge to be voted on May 7th, although improved, still contains problematic language.
Furthermore, in an attempt to prolong this attack on civil society, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group in the European Parliament is pushing for the establishment of an inquiry committee on NGO funding. The purpose of an inquiry committee is to investigate genuine breaches of EU law and is not intended to be used to further push anti-NGO rhetoric. It’s due to these developments that we’ve decided to keep our statement open for further signatures until April 30th.
We ask you to please support us by spreading the form for signatures within your networks. We’ll then repost the statement before the relevant vote on May 7th to reiterate our stance against these attacks.
We thank you for your continued support.
Warm regards,
Civil Society Europe
You can listen here the event
Rewatch here the event in original languages (english and german).
🟦 Report: Sandro Gozi (Renew Europe)
Main theme: Institutional efficiency and the political necessity of treaty reform
Sandro Gozi made a strong case for the urgent need to reform the European Union’s institutional framework. His argument centered on three core issues that, in his view, can no longer be ignored if the EU is to function effectively and remain politically viable.
First, he pointed to the persistent inefficiency of the current governance model. The unanimity rule, he argued, severely limits the EU's ability to respond decisively to global challenges. Using the example of sanctions against Russia, he described how one Member State—notably Hungary—was able to stall the process repeatedly. This, he stressed, is unacceptable in matters of such urgency and importance. Similar delays, he noted, have occurred with Article 7 proceedings and in taxation policy, where unanimity is also required.
Second, Gozi raised the issue of EU enlargement, particularly the planned accession of Ukraine and the Western Balkan countries. Without institutional reform, he warned, the Union will become increasingly paralyzed. "If we are already inefficient with 27 Member States," he asked rhetorically, "how can we possibly expect to function effectively with 34 or more?" He emphasized that reform is not optional, but a prerequisite for a successful and sustainable enlargement.
Third, Gozi invoked historical precedent, noting that every previous enlargement has either been preceded or followed by significant treaty reform. He cited the 1985 Milan Summit as a prime example, where despite initial resistance from Margaret Thatcher, a majority decision to revise the treaties led to the Single European Act and the completion of the single market. This, he argued, demonstrates that bold political leadership and majority-based processes can yield transformative results.
Gozi concluded by calling for a new form of integration based on "a Europe of political will". He proposed allowing willing Member States to proceed with deeper integration without being held back by those who prefer to stand still. According to Gozi, reform is not only possible but necessary, and Europe must act decisively to seize the moment.
🟩 Report: Daniel Freund (Greens/EFA)
Main theme: Structural reform for effective defence and democratic governance
Daniel Freund focused his intervention on the need for profound institutional reform, especially in the realm of European defence and foreign policy. According to Freund, the EU finds itself in a dramatically altered geopolitical landscape, where traditional security guarantees, particularly those provided by the United States, are increasingly unreliable.
This, he argued, demands a paradigm shift. Freund advocated for the creation of a European army, equipped with a unified command structure and joint procurement processes. He acknowledged that such a transformation would require sweeping treaty changes, particularly to eliminate the unanimity rule in foreign policy decisions.
Freund lamented that despite widespread acknowledgment of the need for a united European voice in global affairs, national leaders continue to avoid treaty reform. He noted how each crisis—from the Eurozone and migration crises to Brexit and COVID-19—has been used as an excuse to delay the conversation. "We will never have a 'perfect' moment to reform," he said, "but if we wait, we will simply move from one crisis to the next, always unprepared."
To break the deadlock, Freund outlined a three-part strategy. First, he called for bundling reforms into a comprehensive package to facilitate political trade-offs. Second, he proposed tying treaty reform to the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) discussions, ensuring that financial priorities align with institutional capabilities. Third, he encouraged the use of enhanced cooperation mechanisms to allow a core group of countries to lead the way, creating a "fear of missing out" effect that could motivate others to join.
Finally, Freund passionately defended the role of the European Parliament. He argued that democratic legitimacy and superior policy outcomes can only come from an empowered, elected assembly, rather than backroom deals among heads of state. For Freund, institutional reform is not just about efficiency—it's about democracy.
🟥 Report: Klara Dobrev (S&D)
Main theme: A new European Constitution as a political and democratic act
Klara Dobrev delivered one of the most passionate appeals of the event, framing the current moment as a historic turning point akin to the post-World War II era. Drawing parallels with the Schuman Declaration, she urged fellow leaders to demonstrate the same level of courage and vision shown by the EU’s founders.
Dobrev's central thesis was that Europe needs not just a treaty change, but a new European Constitution. This, she argued, would restore democratic legitimacy, clarify institutional responsibilities, and offer citizens a renewed sense of ownership over the European project. Importantly, she proposed that such a constitution be ratified through a pan-European referendum, thereby directly involving citizens in the future of the Union.
She highlighted three strategic priorities that must be addressed:
- Establishing a single European voice in global affairs.
- Enhancing democratic legitimacy, especially by increasing transparency in Council decision-making.
- Ensuring European security, not only in military terms but also in terms of social cohesion and economic stability.
Dobrev stressed that the debate on the future of Europe will inevitably be politicized, whether leaders like it or not. She pointed to growing disinformation campaigns, external interference from Russia and China, and domestic populism as existential threats to European unity. "If we do not lead this debate," she warned, "our adversaries will."
She concluded by arguing that the window of opportunity is limited. With citizens feeling increasingly insecure and skeptical, now is the time to act boldly and offer a compelling, united vision for Europe's future. For Dobrev, a new constitution is not a luxury—it is a necessity.
🟨 Report: Sven Simon (EPP)
Main theme: Pragmatism, leadership, and flexible integration
Sven Simon took a more cautious yet constructive stance, emphasizing the need for realistic, incremental progress. He opened by identifying a lack of political leadership, even among governments that claim to support a federal Europe. As an example, he criticized the previous German coalition for failing to back up its pro-European rhetoric with tangible proposals.
Simon acknowledged that around 80% of EU legislation is already decided by majority vote, arguing that advocates of reform should avoid focusing too narrowly on politically sensitive areas like foreign policy. He warned that pushing treaty reform in these domains could deepen divisions rather than foster unity.
Instead, he called for a focus on practical, sectoral reforms where consensus is more likely—for example, in innovation, energy policy, and digital infrastructure. He cited the Schengen Area and the Euro as successful models of differentiated integration that could inspire future initiatives.
Simon also drew attention to the fragmentation of European defence efforts, citing inefficiencies in procurement and distrust among Member States. He noted that despite billions spent on defence, much of it still goes to non-European suppliers due to the lack of coordination and strategic trust. While supportive of a stronger European Defence Fund, he cautioned against over-ambitious plans without first solving basic issues of interoperability and industrial alignment.
On the budget, Simon argued for a rebalancing of EU spending priorities, suggesting that the current focus on agriculture and cohesion is outdated. He advocated for greater investment in forward-looking sectors like artificial intelligence, clean technology, and science.
His core message was clear: "Let’s not aim for a grand constitutional leap. Let’s move forward step by step, showing citizens the tangible benefits of European cooperation." For Simon, a more federal Europe is built not in one leap, but in steady, deliberate steps grounded in shared interests.
This article was written by Domènec Ruiz Devesa, President of the Union of European Federalists and Former MEP; and Emiliano Alessandri a scholar and practitioner of European and transatlantic security published on the 24 March 2025 in the Royal Institute elcano, about the need for the United States of Europe and a European Defence.
Europe is arguably going through its most challenging geopolitical inflection point in decades. First, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and now US President Donald Trump’s controversial approach to settling the conflict have upended the already fragile European security order that has kept the continent largely at peace for the past 80 years. In this fast-shifting geopolitical context, a disoriented Europe feels vulnerable as perhaps never before.
This paper argues that faced with a White House whose request is no longer that Europe just ‘steps up’ but also that it steps aside on existential issues such as Ukraine’s future, European countries need to increasingly take security and defence into their own hands. While there is nothing to cheer about the decline of NATO, European leaders should work towards immediately reinforcing the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance but also adopt measures that would protect their security should a post-NATO security order emerge because of the ongoing geopolitical reshuffling.
Although not immediately within reach, the vision of a future European Defence Union should animate and underpin ongoing deliberations among EU countries and their partners. This paper outlines an agenda for Europe in this respect. Meanwhile, all efforts should be put towards supporting Kyiv at this most decisive juncture. How the war ends will determine the security context in which Europe will operate in the years to come.
Read the article here: LINK.
PC 1 Chair Luca Lionello, professor of European Law at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, participated in an interview togheter Maria Tadeo, The Grand Continent, regarding the European Defence future on SKY ITALY TG24.
The interview focused on the topic of European rearmament of individual countries and how a ‘European defence’ in the sense of greater integration of individual countries' defences within a Structured and Permanent Cooperation can be developed with non-EU countries.
Lionello's answer was: ‘PESCO allows us to do many things but the problem is the decision-making system, which unfortunately is still unanimous in foreign and defence policy. So you can do something now but in perspective you have to reform the Treaties.’
‘But what is the difference with the cooperation achieved to make the Euro?’ the journalist continued. Luca replied, ‘The Euro was made a unanimous treaty with exceptions made to some countries. By contrast, foreign policy and defence can be done but it will only be done between willing countries in contrast to countries that are against it. We have to wait for the new German chancellor to see what proposals he will make together with Macron.'
‘But wouldn't it be possible to reuse the old CED Treaty that was not approved in the 1950s to speed up the construction of a European defence?’ ‘It is a fascinating hypothesis but difficult to resurrect because it was written in another historical context and only between 6 countries but it can serve as a model. However, making European defence does not mean having an army of men in European uniforms and with a European flag. It is much more complex than that: It is much more complex than that: what is a priority is a common foreign policy because having a collective but unanimously decided instrument of 27 would not be possible. Defence policy needs strategy, vision, industrial structure. As long as a country like Hungary stops everything doesn't work. The question in the coming months is how to overcome the intergovernmental dimension and give a voice to the European Parliament, which has no voice.’’
It is much more complex than that: what is a priority is a common foreign policy because having a collective but unanimously decided instrument of 27 would not be possible. Defence policy needs strategy, vision, industrial structure. As long as a country like Hungary stops everything doesn't work. The question in the coming months is how to overcome the intergovernmental dimension and give a voice to the European Parliament, which has no voice.’
Towards the end of the conversation, the question was asked: ‘Is there a way to kick someone out of the European Union?’ No because the EU is a unique international organisation, an association of states but also of citizens, so you cannot kick out one of its members as you would in any other international organisation. The solution is not to kick someone out but to advance the integration project in order to confront Orban and his loyalists with the contradiction of staying out of a stronger and more cohesive Europe.’
To watch the video in Italian: LINK.