STATEMENT ON FRENCH ADVANCED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to extend France’s nuclear deterrence to European partners offers a significant political signal towards the establishment of a common European defence outside the NATO framework, even if it stops far short of creating a fully shared European nuclear force.  The French proposal is a response to the relaunch of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces but also to US ambiguous stance towards European security.

With this proposal, France has declared that the overall continental security affects its vital national interests and therefore offers to integrate the interests of other European partners in its strategic reflection, including common consultations on threats; joint work on intelligence and detection, air defence, and deep-strike capabilities; the possibility to participate in nuclear military exercises; and the deployment of nuclear-armed French air forces in other European countries to enhance forward deterrence.

In addition, while the French-German joint statement of 2 March states that advanced deterrence it is meant to strengthen the NATO nuclear mission, and the “systems of collective security” of both the Atlantic Alliance (article 5 of the Treaty of Washington) and of the EU (article 42.7 Treaty on the European Union), the proposal would create a second, independent, and NATO-consistent layer of European nuclear deterrence. Both France and Germany emphasize that this plan respects the Treaty on Non-Proliferation.

On the other hand, President Macron has ruled out any allied participation in planning, implementation or decision about the use of the French nuclear arsenal. It will remain strictly under national command and control, with the President of the Republic retaining sole authority over its use. In legal terms, the force de frappe remains entirely French.

Macron has also stressed that advance deterrence is not an explicit security guarantee. Any extension of deterrence would remain deliberately ambiguous, preserving the flexibility that is central to the current nuclear strategy. As a result, partner states would gain political assurance and strategic dialogue, but not a codified, legally binding nuclear guarantee.

These two limitations constitute the price that Europe as a whole is paying because of decades of missed opportunities to integrate and strengthen its defence cooperation while national governments did not address the issue of creating shared sovereignty in time by thoroughly reforming its institutions, despite the process undertaken in this regard by the Conference on the Future of Europe and the proposals drawn up in the European Parliament in recent years.

Even in the current intergovernmental framework, however, and with the noted restrictions, this major move will not only benefit France but potentially all EU Member States, by offering a second, European layer of nuclear deterrence.

Therefore, the Union of European Federalists welcomes that some EU member states already accepted the French proposal of advanced deterrence and calls on all the others to do so, with a view of integrating it in the Common Defence envisioned on article 42 of the Treaty of the European Union, through Permanent Structured Cooperation.  In this regard, the UEF recalls its policy proposal for a Common European Defense System published in March 2025, which supported already the “Europeanisation of French uclear capabilities with shared financing from willing EU member States”.

This can be the very first step towards pooling warheads and the establishment of a European multinational force comparable to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, a common European nuclear budget, and share decision-making power, with an EU “nuclear button,” eventually with the transfer of operational control to the European Union.

UEF also calls all Member States and EU institutions to support our proposal on a common European defence, consisting of the national armies of the Member States and a 28th European Army, coordinated in a common structure, compatible with NATO and serving as its European Pillar.

For this purpose - since European security requires to move towards collective burden-sharing, from intelligence gathering to budget allocating, and therefore the democratic governance of this evolution - the answer lies in a parallel progressive federalization of matters of European interest, so that European citizens can decide their future and the means to reach for it, through their European Parliament and executive.

The UEF share also the French president's view that the ultimate goal is a world without nuclear arms. This is a goal that can only be fully achieved through a world federation, but a sovereign Europe could already contribute to bringing this goal closer by committing itself to building a cooperative world order based on shared rules, in which diplomacy and international law once again become the instruments for pursuing international political objectives.